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 Management accounting, engineering and the management of company 
growth: Clarke Chapman, 1864 -1914 
Abstract 
This research examines the relationship between management accounting 
and engineering in the processes of strategic decision-making and 
managerial control underlying the management of growth in Clarke 
Chapman, 1864 – 1914. The research finds that strategic decisions to invest 
in new technologies were grounded in the engineering ethos of the firm, 
market awareness and information derived from the firm’s extensive 
business networks. Decisions regarding the (dis)continuance of existing 
strategic directions were based on management accounting information and 
product and market awareness. The management and control of costs were 
important factors underlying significant re-organisations of the firm.  
Managerial control was exercised on a direct, personal basis and was 
undertaken in conjunction with the use of routine and ad hoc management 
accounting reports.   
The current research makes two major contributions to our knowledge of 
the development of management accounting. First, it finds that Clarke 
Chapman’s management accounting system evolved incrementally to match 
the growth requirements of the firm. The research finds no evidence of 
periodic fluctuations in demand having a significant impact on the 
development of the management accounting system. Second, the current 
research indicates that there is no evidence of conflict between professional 
groupings of engineers and accountants over the ownership of the 
management accounting system which was rooted in the accounting 
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function. In this respect, it is considered significant that engineering and 
accounting were both represented at very senior levels in the firm.  
Keywords: Clarke Chapman; engineering; growth; management accounting; 
networks; fluctuations in demand 
1.   Introduction 
For much of the twentieth century, histories of British costing (Edwards, 
1937; Pollard, 1965) held that little meaningful development took place until 
the ‘costing renaissance’ of the late nineteenth century. However, detailed 
archival research (e.g. Boyns, 1993; Boyns and Edwards, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 
1997b, 2007; Edwards et al, 1995; Fleischman and Parker, 1991, 1992) has 
led to the formation of a “new conventional wisdom” (Boyns and Edwards, 
1997a, p. 2) which demonstrates the long use of sophisticated costing 
systems in the provision of information for managerial decision-making.  
It is acknowledged that more archive-based research is required in order to 
increase our understanding of the development of costing (e.g. Boyns and 
Edwards, 1995; Fleischman and Tyson, 2000; Fleming et al, 2000; McKinstry, 
1999).  However, the current authors consider that it is appropriate to use 
the term ‘management accounting’, rather than costing, in this paper. The 
authors follow Boyns and Edwards (1997a) in adopting the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales’ (ICAEW) view of management 
accounting as being the provision of ‘accounting information which is of 
direct assistance to the management in the formulation of policy and in the 
day-to-day control of a business’ (ICAEW, 1954, para. 3). Thus, in terms of  
Chandler’s analysis (Chandler 1990), management accounting is engaged in 
both the strategy and structure of organisations: ‘on the one hand it is 
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synonymous with the provision of information for strategic decision-making  
and on the other with information for everyday managerial control 
purposes’ (Boyns and Edwards, 1997a, p. 22). The research literature (Boyns 
and Edwards, 1996; Edwards, Boyns, Anderson, 1995; McLean, 2006) 
indicates that the main motivation for management accounting innovation 
in Britain ‘was not to enable the control of labour . . . but to aid the provision 
of performance indicators considered relevant for a range of routine and 
strategic business decisions’ (Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p.17). 
The current paper builds upon and extends previous studies (Fleming, 
McKinstry,and Wallace, 2000; Hopper, Cooper, Lowe and Capps, 1986; 
McKinstry, 1999; McLean, 2013; McLean and Tyson, 2006) which have 
analysed the impact of engineering environments on the development of 
management accounting and, in particular, have scrutinised the notion that 
engineers and accountants were ‘fighting for turf’ (Boyns and Edwards, 
2007, p.980) in a battle for the control of the management accounting 
function. In their study of cost accounting in the shipbuilding, engineering 
and metals industries of the West of Scotland, c.1900 – 1960, Fleming, 
McKinstry and Wallace (2000) found that an inhibiting engineering culture 
was a factor underlying the non-development of standard costing  and 
budgetary control in these industries. Mcinstry (1999, p.219) noted that the 
engineering-oriented culture of a Scottish vehicle manufacturer in the 
twentieth century led to the company’s preference for ‘control systems of a 
non-financial kind’. Similarly, McLean and Tyson (2006, p.413) concluded 
that standard costing and budgetary control were not widely employed in 
the post-Second World War North East England shipbuilding industry 
because ‘the engineering culture of the shipbuilding industry promoted the 
use of ‘alternative’, non-accounting measurement systems’. Hopper, Cooper, 
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Lowe and Capps (1986) noted that although standard costing and budgetary 
control systems were installed in the National Coal Board during this period, 
their proper operation and use were undermined by the organisation’s 
engineers and dominant engineering culture. However, McLean (2013) 
researched the activities of a shipbuilding company during the period 1886 – 
1915 and found that its engineers and accountants were not ‘fighting for 
turf’ (Boyns and Edwards, 2007, p. 980) in a war of the professions. Rather, 
in this company, separate disciplines of cost engineering and costing were 
developed to serve very different functions. Cost engineering provided 
information for cost management and for cost estimation, pricing and 
tendering while costing provided information for performance measurement 
and for the operation of managerial accountability and managerial reward 
systems.  
The particular objective of the current paper is to examine the relationship 
between management accounting and engineering in the processes of 
strategic decision-making and routine managerial control, including the 
control of labour, underlying the management of growth and fluctuations in 
demand in Clarke Chapman, 1864 - 1914. In pursuing this objective, the 
current research examines ‘the complexity of the nature and process of 
(management) accounting change’ (Boyns and Edwards, 2013, p. 23). This 
article makes two major contributions to our knowledge of the development 
of management accounting. First, it indicates that Clarke Chapman’s 
management accounting system developed in a gradual, evolutionary 
manner related to the general growth trend of the firm; it did not change 
significantly and suddenly in the context of fluctuations in demand and 
organisational shock. Second, this research finds that there is no evidence of 
conflict between engineers and managers over the ownership of Clarke 
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Chapman’s management accounting system. The fact that engineering and 
accounting professions were both represented at very senior levels of the 
firm is considered to be significant in this respect. This article is presented in 
five further sections: Clarke Chapman, the context; accountants and 
engineers: actors and change agents; management accounting, engineering 
and strategic decisions; management accounting, engineering and 
managerial control; and conclusions.  
2.   Clarke Chapman, the context  
2.1 The research site 
The current research is based on an examination of the extensive but 
incomplete Clarke Chapman collection (DS/CC) held by the Tyne Wear 
Archive Service in Newcastle Upon Tyne. Although the firm was founded in 
1864, the vast bulk of the archive dates from after 1883, when a partnership 
re-configuration took place. A further increase in documentation occurred 
after 1893, when Clarke Chapman was formed as a limited company.  A 
study of the archive collection (DS/CC) of this British engineering company 
and a reading of the related literature (e.g. Manders, 1980) indicate several 
factors which justify the selection of Clarke Chapman in the period 1864 – 
1914 as a valuable site for the research of management accounting and the 
management of company growth. First, from its foundation in 1864 the firm 
grew to become the United Kingdom’s leading supplier of auxiliary 
machinery for the shipbuilding industry and the largest manufacturing 
employer in its home base of Gateshead.  Second, Clarke Chapman 
instigated and experienced profound organisational changes, including the 
transitions from partnership to limited company and from entrepreneurial to 
managerial control. Third, during this period known as the Second Industrial 
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Revolution (Landes, 2003, p.235), Clarke Chapman was at the forefront of 
technological change and was permeated by engineering values and 
capabilities. Fourth, the firm managed the problems of risk and uncertainty, 
which were particularly pronounced in its market sectors and its strategic 
cum technological decision-making, whilst maintaining financial stability and 
providing adequate financial returns to investors. 
2.2 Company growth and fluctuations in demand 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the British shipbuilding industry 
experienced rapid technological and organisational transformation as 
wooden sailing ships were replaced by metal steam ships. Metal shipbuilding 
was a new industry based on engineering and the assembly of component 
parts purchased from networks of suppliers (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p. 
89). In 1864, William Clarke founded an engineering partnership in 
Gateshead, on the River Tyne in the North East of England, to act as a 
manufacturer and supplier of small hand winches to the shipbuilding 
industry. Clarke was astute in his choice of location and industry. Gateshead 
was located in a region with strong comparative advantages in terms of 
developed metals industries and related skilled labour forces (Lorenz, 1991, 
pp. 25 – 26; Slaven, 1980, p. 107). Moreover, it was ideally placed to serve 
the growing British metal shipbuilding industry which was concentrated 
largely on the River Clyde in Scotland and on the Rivers Tyne, Wear and Tees 
in the North East of England. During the research period, Britain was the 
world’s leading shipbuilding nation and merchant tonnage built in Britain 
increased by 545% whilst Admiralty tonnage also increased significantly 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979, pp. 250 – 253).  
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However, other radical developments were being carried through in British 
industry during this period. The late nineteenth - early twentieth century 
‘saw the lusty childhood, if not the birth, of electrical power and motors; 
organic chemistry .  . . the internal combustion engine and automotive 
devices; precision manufacture . .  (the) cluster of innovations that have 
earned the name of the Second Industrial Revolution’ (Landes, 2003, p. 235). 
Clarke Chapman was at the forefront of many of the technological 
developments of this era and in the manufacture and sale of the resultant 
products, whilst continuing to develop and diversify its original core business 
as an engineer of auxiliary equipment for the shipbuilding industry. From a 
small-scale start-up in1864, by 1914 Clarke Chapman had grown to employ 
2,262 people (DS/CC1/129/3), and had annual sales of over £512,000 and 
total fixed assets of c. £310,000 at book value (DS/CC1/77/3). However, 
Clarke Chapman did not experience constant, steady growth but rather a 
series of sharp downturns and rapid growth spurts within the overall growth 
trend (Table 1), the downturns being due largely to depressions within the 
shipbuilding industry and labour disputes in engineering and shipbuilding 
(DS/CC1/2/1). 
INSERT TABLE 1  
Thus, in examining the relationship between management accounting and 
engineering in the processes underlying the management of growth in 
Clarke Chapman, the current paper pays due consideration to the impact of 
periodic fluctuations in demand. 
3.   Accountants, engineers and networks: actors and change agents 
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Although Clarke Chapman was founded by an engineer and was always 
permeated by engineering values, throughout its history considerable 
attention was also paid to building and maintaining a management 
accounting infrastructure and to building business networks. In order to 
understand this state of affairs, it is important to consider the role of 
individual ‘actors’ (Yamey 1981, p. 131)and ‘change agents’ (Boyns and 
Edwards, 1996) in organisational and accounting change (Antonelli, Boyns 
and Cerbioni, 2008, p. 76). Thus, brief information on some of Clarke 
Chapman’s key figures is presented below. 
William Clarke was educated in the North East of England and undertook his 
engineering apprenticeship with the noted Newcastle firm of Armstrong, 
Mitchell and Company. Clarke became a prominent Gateshead businessman 
but, as Boswell (1983, p.237) has indicated, Victorian businessmen often had 
social as well as business motivations. Clarke was active in his social and 
philanthropic endeavours in Gateshead and was, variously, a Justice of the 
Peace, a town councillor, Organiser for the Volunteer Corps, Treasurer of the 
Children’s Hospital, Supporter of the Northern Counties Institute for the 
Deaf, Methodist Church Treasurer and provider of reading rooms and 
science education for the local population 
(www.localhistorygateshead.com).  From the inception of his firm in 1864 
and his initial strategic choices of location and industry, William Clarke 
focused on the functions of engineering and technological development and 
production. In 1870 Clarke took a new partner, Joseph Gurney, a Quaker and 
a member of the Gurney banking family, who had strong links with Quaker 
financial institutions such as Friends Provident which eventually became a 
major  debenture holder in Clarke Chapman (Kindleberger, 1987; The Times, 
11 May, 1866, p. 11). Gurney took on the role of accounting and financial 
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management in his partnership with Clarke (Openshaw, 1989, p. 3) whilst 
Clarke continued to focus on engineering and product development.  
In 1874, Captain Abel Henry Chapman joined the firm to form the 
partnership of Clarke, Chapman and Gurney and the firm moved to a larger 
site in Gateshead (Manders, 1980, p.73). Chapman was Gurney’s nephew 
and was closely related, through both his mother and his father, to the 
Barclay banking family. Furthermore, both the Chapman and Gurney families 
were inter-married with prominent Quaker banking families in the North 
East of England (Durham University Special Collections). It is possible that 
Captain Chapman’s introduction of capital provided or facilitated the input 
of funds required to finance this expansion, although no evidence can be 
offered to support this contention. On joining the engineering partnership, 
Captain Chapman worked alongside Gurney in the accounting and financial 
management functions until Gurney left the partnership in 1884 and 
Chapman took overall responsibility for these roles (DS/CC1/1; Openshaw, 
1989, p.3).   
In 1884, Captain Chapman arranged for the purchase and conversion of a 
local manor house in order to accommodate the firm’s accounting, clerical 
and management staff (Manders, 1980, p. 130). After Clarke’s death in 1890, 
Captain Chapman instigated a series of changes in organisational structure 
and in accounting staff and systems, including, in 1893, the conversion of the 
firm from partnership to limited company status. In the draft prospectus for 
the limited company, Captain Chapman described himself as an ‘engineer’ 
(DS/CC1/11). This was an interesting choice of word because he was not a 
trained or professional engineer. He may have thought of himself as an 
engineer, as he was the head of an engineering company, or he may have 
11 
 
used the term in order to inspire confidence amongst investors but his 
background lay far from engineering. Captain Chapman had served in the 
Bengal Cavalry between 1856 and 1874 but, rather unusually for an Army 
officer, his parents were Quakers. In fact, the Chapmans were a Quaker 
banking family and, moreover, Captain Chapman’s mother was related to 
the Barclay and Gurney banking families (Phillips, 1894). Thus, Captain 
Chapman provided Clarke Chapman with further access to financial and 
administrative expertise to complement its existing strengths. 
Captain Chapman’s eldest son, Henry, an engineer who had served a 
premium engineering apprenticeship, was named as a Director of the newly 
formed limited company in 1893 along with J.B. Furneaux, another engineer 
who was appointed as Managing Director (DS/CC1/11). On his father’s death 
in 1902, Henry Chapman succeeded to the role of Chairman of Clarke 
Chapman; later that year he instituted an extension and reorganisation of 
the firm’s premises and facilities and, in the process, abolished the post of 
Managing Director. At this point J.B. Furneaux resigned from Clarke 
Chapman (DS/CC1/1/1) leaving Henry Chapman as the dominant figure. 
However, in 1908, Henry Chapman resigned due to ill health and was 
succeeded by Henry Walker, one of the firm’s senior engineers, who 
developed the firm along the trajectory set by the Chapmans (Florence, 
1953).  
Although Clarke Chapman was an engineering firm, from its very early days 
the key figures of Joseph Gurney and Captain Chapman occupied important 
roles in accounting and financial management, giving these disciplines 
authority and status within the firm. Further specialist accounting staff 
members were developed by the firm. Robert Scope, originally employed by 
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Gurney as office boy in 1864, was promoted to the position of Company 
Secretary of the newly formed limited company in 1893 and became a 
Company Director in 1901. William Taylor, who had been recruited as a clerk 
in the counting house in 1892, rose through the accounting ranks to become 
manager of the London office and, in 1901, he succeeded Robert Scope as 
Company Secretary (DS/CC1/1/1; Openshaw, 1989). Thus, Clarke Chapman 
had real strength in both accounting and engineering within the firm.  
Moreover, Clarke Chapman had significant strength in industrial and 
financial networks outside of the firm. Networks based on personal 
relationships and trust underlay Clarke Chapman’s core business in the 
shipbuilding and marine engineering industry (Boyce,2003; McLean, 2013; 
Pollard and Robertson, 1979). At the very inception of his business, William 
Clarke engaged the Quaker solicitor Robert Spence Watson to act for him. 
Robert Spence Watson was an amazingly well-connected and active man, 
and Clarke Chapman derived great benefit from his vast banking, financial 
and industrial networks (Corder,1914; DF.SPW; Newcastle University Special 
Collections; Watson, 1969).  
On incorporation in 1893, members of the Chapman family held 80 per cent 
of the ordinary shares of the limited company (DS/CC1/31) and continued to 
be majority shareholders throughout the research period (DS/CC1/28/2). 
Whether the company was headed by an engineer or an accountant, Clarke 
Chapman adopted conservative policies in respect of dividends and 
Directors’ salaries. The prospectus (DS/CC1/11) specifically limited the 
ordinary share dividend to a maximum of 5 per cent in each of the first five 
years and limited the salaries of the three Directors to a combined total of 
£3,000 per annum for the same period. In fact, the firm followed 
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conservative policies in respect of salaries and dividends throughout the 
research period. Directors’ salaries were always modest by contemporary 
standards (McLean, 2013) and ordinary dividends were not paid in four of 
five years immediately following the incorporation of the firm. Thereafter, 
dividends were never more than c. 6 per cent of ordinary share capital and 
no dividends were paid in 1908, 1910 and 1912 -14, despite 1912 – 14 being 
the most profitable years in the firm’s history to date (DS/CC1/74/2).  
It is apparent that the Chapman family and the firm’s Directors took a long 
term view of the company and were not in the engineering business simply 
for short term financial gain, and so their strategic decisions and managerial 
controls must be assessed in light of this. Moreover, despite its 
incorporation as a limited company, Clarke Chapman remained a family 
owned firm which, in effect, was managed as a partnership by a small group 
of family members and long-serving managers. In this context, decision-
making is often personal and informal: it is based on face-to-face discussions 
rather than formal information systems (Boyce, 2003).  
Furthermore, contemporary engineering attitudes must be borne in mind 
when assessing the roles of Clarke Chapman’s management accounting 
system in strategic decision making and managerial control. For example, 
Edwin L. Orde, Vice President of the North East Coast Institution of Engineers 
and Shipbuilders, and his fellow engineers were clearly appalled by the case 
of the Woolwich Arsenal, where in 1906 ‘clerical administrative labour’ had 
amounted to 4 per cent of the total wages bill. Orde declared (Transactions, 
1916, p.51) that ‘the elaboration of detail is only too apt to increase to a 
point where the cost of working the (management accounting) system 
becomes too high’. The managers of Clarke Chapman were well aware of the 
difficulty of covering the fixed costs of ‘establishment charges’ during 
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economic downturns (DS/CC1/2/1) and it is probable that, like their 
contemporaries (McLean, 1996), they undertook implicit cost-benefit 
analyses of their management accounting system and were sparing in the 
authorisation of developments of it. Clarke Chapman’s cautious attitude to 
management accounting development may be inferred from the tight 
restrictions it placed on increases in clerical labour. For example, between 
1904 and 1914 sales increased from £329,000 to £512,000 (Table 1), an 
increase of 56 per cent, yet during this period the number of clerks remained 
static at 45 whilst junior clerks increased only by 7, from 19 to 26 
(DS/CC1/129/3). In this environment, it is likely that there were strict 
controls on the extension of the management accounting system and it is 
unlikely that the firm would have borne the cost of producing information 
that was not useful. 
In examining the development of Clarke Chapman’s management accounting 
system, it may be noted that the research literature (Edwards, Hammersley 
and Newell, 1990; Fleischman and Parker, 1992; McKendrick, 1970; McLean, 
1995; 2013; Wells, 1977) indicates that technological change and pressure 
on selling prices in competitive markets during periods of falling demand are 
important factors in stimulating demand for change and development in 
management accounting systems. However, in the period 1864 – 1914, 
Clarke Chapman experienced both rapidly declining demand, e.g. the mid to 
late 1880s, 1902 – 1904 and 1907 – 1908, and rapidly increasing demand, 
e.g. 1897 – 1898 and 1911 – 1914 (see Table 1). Thus the relationship 
between these fluctuations in demand and management accounting 
development is an important factor for consideration in the current 
research. 
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4.   Management accounting, engineering and strategic decisions 
In the business strategy literature, much of the research on company growth 
is concerned with ‘how much’ companies grow rather than on ‘how’ they 
grow (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010, pp.261 – 262). Moreover, this literature 
tends to deal with relatively short time periods (e.g. Garnsey, Stam and 
Heffernan, 2006; Mishina, Pollock and Porac, 2004). However, as the 
economist Edith Penrose has noted (Penrose, 2009, p.237) in this context, 
‘history matters’ and, thus, it is useful to examine how companies grow over 
time. Using long time frames, business histories (e.g. Coleman, 1969; Payne, 
1979; Reader, 1970) have examined the development of large-scale British 
companies and management accounting histories (e.g. Boyns and Edwards 
1997a) have explored issues related to accounting systems, organisational 
structure and management decision making in expanding British companies.  
Up to 1914, Clarke Chapman’s management accounting system was 
developed to include annual management accounts, analyses of trading 
results, a product costing system, monthly analyses of sales and orders by 
product group, comparative output tables, weekly reports of numbers 
employed, weekly returns of wages and output, weekly and monthly salaries 
analyses and profit forecast statements. Clarke Chapman’s management 
accounting system was employed largely for management control purposes 
(see Section 5. below) but it produced information that fed into some areas 
of strategic decision making. The current section of this article presents an 
analysis of the strategic choices underlying Clarke Chapman’s development 
and examines how management accounting and engineering were engaged 
in the firm’s strategic decision making processes (Mckelvie and Wiklund, 
2010, pp. 261 – 262).  
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Operating within a generally expanding shipbuilding and marine engineering 
industry, by the 1870s William Clarke’s firm had grown to employ 350 men 
in the manufacture of a growing range of shipbuilding components including 
steam winches, windlasses, capstans, pumps, deck and dockside cranes and 
boilers. Building upon its engineering expertise but diversifying its market 
sectors, the firm also began to design and produce locomotive boilers 
(Openshaw, 1989, p. 4). In 1874, Clarke was joined in partnership by Captain 
Abel Henry Chapman. In the 1880s, advised and aided by their solicitor, 
Robert Spence Watson, Clarke and Chapman took two crucial, inter-linked 
strategies that were to shape the future of their firm through to 1914 
(Corder, 1914; DF.SPW; Watson, 1969).  
First, the partners refrained from involvement in the forward or backward 
integration of the late nineteenth century ‘amalgamation movement’ 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p.96) whereby shipbuilders sought to capture 
markets and component suppliers and, in turn, component suppliers sought 
to secure their shipbuilding markets. In developing this strategy, Clarke and 
Chapman were aided both by their general awareness of the market 
environment of shipbuilding and engineering and by their annual 
management accounts (DS/CC1/74/1), which presented them with a very 
clear view of the fluctuations in demand within this market and the 
potentially disastrous financial consequences of continuing dependence 
upon their traditional, core technologies and products.  
However, in a major strategic development of the 1880s, Clarke and 
Chapman tapped into and acted upon Spence Watson’s knowledge and 
networks and chose to diversify into electrical engineering. Spence Watson 
was the brother-in-law of J.T.Merz, a leading electrical engineer and 
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entrepreneur and, furthermore, through his contacts with Lord Armstrong, 
the armaments, engineering and shipbuilding magnate, he had encountered 
the brilliant young electrical engineer, Charles A. Parsons (Corder, 1914; 
DF.SPW; Watson, 1969). Spence Watson helped to make Clarke and 
Chapman aware of the boom in demand for electric lighting systems 
(Shiman, 1993) and in 1884 he facilitated the entry of Parsons into the 
partnership as Chief Electrical Engineer in their newly established Electric 
Works (Scaife, 2000, p. 150). Parsons focused on the development and 
manufacture of electric lighting systems and turbine generators for both 
marine and land-based markets (Scaife, 2000, pp. 177 and 190). Historic 
management accounting information formed a backcloth to these strategic 
decisions to diversify Clarke Chapman’s technologies, products and markets 
but, crucially, the decisions were informed by networks and informal 
assessments of market potential.  
In 1889, Parsons proposed that the firm should move into the production of 
larger turbines designed for use in land-based power stations. However, 
Clarke and Chapman approached these proposals with caution. They knew 
that Clarke Chapman was Gateshead’s ‘only large engineering firm to survive 
the trade depression of . . the 1880s’ (Manders, 1980, p. 73). Furthermore, 
their annual management accounts (DS/CC1/74/1) provided clear evidence 
of their firm’s lack of resources for expansion. Based on their experience and 
assessments together with the management accounting evidence, Clarke 
and Chapman took the strategic decision to reject Parsons’ proposals and he 
left the partnership. This decision had significant strategic implications for 
the firm. Without Parsons, Clarke Chapman was unable to exploit the 
increase in demand from private firms for power generation turbines that 
resulted from the 1888 amendment to the Electric Lighting Act of 1882; this 
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amendment had lengthened firms’ tenure of central power stations from 21 
to 42 years, thus making capital investment conditions more favourable 
(Hughes, 1962). In this instance, the strategic caution of Clarke and Chapman 
caused the firm to miss the opportunity to participate in new and dynamic 
technologies and markets: the operation of the Electric Works depended 
upon Parsons’ personal expertise and, on his departure, it was closed down. 
After Clarke’s death in 1890, Captain Chapman instituted major changes in 
both the administrative and technical management of the firm in order to 
build a firm capable of surviving and prospering in the Second Industrial 
Revolution (Landes, 2003, p.235). This was a period of rapid development in 
world trading patterns, shipyard equipment and in ship design, technology 
and auxiliary equipment (Pollard and Robertson, 1979). The Suez Canal had 
opened in 1864, expanding trade with the Far East and, from the 1880s 
particularly, the meat trade with Australia and New Zealand and the fruit 
trade with tropical regions. The 1880s saw the installation of electric lighting 
and some electrically driven machinery in shipyards and by 1902 factory 
inspectors reported that ‘electric power was general in all up-to-date 
shipyards’ (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p. 121). Bigger ships were 
constructed in a growing variety of designs, increasing the size and range of 
auxiliary equipment required; refrigeration equipment was required for 
ships in the meat and fruit trades. Furthermore, the arms race with Germany 
began c.1900 and when John Fisher was appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty in 1904 the process of naval reform and warship construction 
began in earnest. 
Seeking protection from the impact of economic recession and market 
fluctuations which had caused widespread bankruptcies in the shipbuilding 
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and engineering industries in the 1880s (Manders, 1980; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979) and aware of the rapid changes in the business 
environment and his core and other markets, in 1893 Captain Chapman led 
the conversion of the partnership into a limited company. The  draft 
prospectus declared that ‘The Firm are manufacturers of Steam Auxiliary 
Machinery for Steamships – such as Windlasses, Capstans, Cargo Winches, 
Cranes, Standing Gear , Feed and Ballast Pumps, Donkey Boilers . . . and for 
such articles we occupy first position in the kingdom’ (DS/CC1/11).  Captain 
Chapman was appointed Chairman of the new company; J.B. Furneaux, an 
engineer, became Managing Director and Henry R. Chapman, Captain 
Chapman’s eldest son, was appointed as a Director. Furthermore, Captain 
Chapman extended and developed the firm’s strategy of recruiting talented 
engineering staff able to make important contributions to its knowledge 
base with a view to bringing new products to market. Woodeson (1890), 
Butler (1891), Horne (1893) and Walker (1894) were prominent amongst the 
staff brought into Clarke Chapman in order to enhance and develop the 
firm’s capabilities and product ranges in mechanical and electrical 
engineering. Building on Clarke Chapman’s established knowledge base, and 
with varying degrees of commercial success, each of these men developed 
many products for which they took out joint worldwide patents with the 
company and received royalties on production (DS/CC1/1/1; Openshaw, 
1989).  
During the brief operations of the Electric Works under Parsons, the firm’s 
management accounts (DS/CC1/74/1) had made Chapman aware of the 
profitability of this technology and he had had ample time to make informal 
assessments of its potential. On these bases, in 1892 Chapman took the 
strategic decision to re-open the Electric Works and begin the manufacture 
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and installation of both marine and land-based lighting and power-
generation systems; land-based work was carried out in both industrial and 
domestic premises.  Other developments of new technology were, of 
necessity, based on the firm’s engineering ethos and its market awareness 
rather than formal management accounting analysis. Clarke Chapman began 
to manufacture searchlights employing patented mirrors and lenses and, by 
1898, was added to the Admiralty and War Office lists of approved suppliers 
(DS/CC1/2/1). In a further strategic move, a later recruit, Robert Harris, 
developed technologies and products in the fields of electrical resistance, 
electrical control gear, solenoids and electro magnets. Furthermore, another 
new recruit, John Robson, was employed to design and construct apparatus 
for use in vaporising ammonia. Robson’s work was successful and, under 
worldwide patent, was employed in applications for ship refrigeration 
equipment in the long-haul meat and fruit trades (DS/CC1/1/1).  
Thus, engineering ethos and market awareness rather than historic, 
internally-orientated management accounting provided the basis for 
strategic decisions to move into new technologies and products. However, 
Clarke Chapman did employ its management accounting system to check on 
the success or failure of its various ventures and to make strategic decisions 
as to whether to continue or discontinue them. This may be illustrated by 
examining strategic decisions relating to engines developed by William 
Butler, who had been recruited by Chapman in 1891. Before joining Clarke 
Chapman, in 1888 Butler had developed the first British velocycle, or motor 
car. Clarke Chapman recruited Butler to strengthen its capabilities in the 
building of oil and gas engines to power machinery and electric lighting. The 
management accounting system (DS/CC1/1/1) revealed that by 1897 the 
firm had invested £8,000 in the development of Butler’s engines and J. B. 
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Furneaux noted (DS/CC1/2/1) that ‘ . . one of the earliest babes of the 
Company . . . the Motor Car Engine has brought us a certain return (on) our 
outlay  . . . and will more than cover all our Experimental Expenses beside 
leaving us in full possession of the patents of Oil, Gas and Launch Engines.’  
By 1898, the Directors were expressing reservations about this work but, 
when efforts to sell the patents failed, they decided to invest a further £500 
in development. In 1900, the outcome of all of this investment was 
described as the best engine on the market because of its ‘silent working, 
quick starting and absolute control of the speed for driving electric dynamos 
where steadiness of action is of paramount importance’, and the company 
viewed the patent as ‘a most valuable asset’ and expected to generate ‘large 
returns from it’ (DS/CC1/74/1). However, there were technical problems 
with the design of Butler’s engines and production was discontinued in 1902, 
although Clarke Chapman continued to employ Butler to develop patented 
gas engines and pumps. In a further example of the use of management 
accounting information in strategic continue/dis-continue decisions, in 1907 
Harry Chapman stated (DS/CC1/2/1) that ‘(regarding) our Water Tube Boiler 
. . we are fully in hopes of obtaining a good return from it though it has been 
an expensive business so far.’ Thus, Clarke Chapman’s business strategy 
often involved the risk and uncertainty of working at the cutting edge of 
technological development and, in this context, the firm’s Directors used 
management accounting information in making strategic continue/dis-
continue decisions.  
As indicated above in relation to the refusal to accept Parsons’ plans to 
produce large turbines, there was an element of caution in Clarke 
Chapman’s strategic decision making. There was good reason for this 
caution: the firm was a rare Gateshead survivor of the economic depression 
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of the 1880s (Manders, 1980, p.73) and its annual management accounts 
(DS/CC1/74/1) presented a clear picture of the impact of this depression on 
the firm’s financial performance and financial position. Nevertheless, 
Penrose (2009, p. 56) has argued that enterprise includes ‘the willingness to 
search for ways of avoiding risk and still expand.’ Clarke Chapman took 
several interlinked decisions which enabled expansion whilst limiting fixed 
costs, risk and uncertainty. First, the firm centralised all production at its 
Gateshead factory rather than setting up further manufacturing facilities at 
home and overseas. Second, from 1894 onwards, rather than employing 
sales staff directly, the firm established networks of sales agents throughout 
the United Kingdom and on a world-wide basis (DS/CC1/1/1; DS.HL/5/2/13).  
Third, Clarke Chapman generated further growth in world-wide sales by 
granting licenses to overseas firms to manufacture its patented products 
(DS/CC1/1/1). Fourth, the firm began to act as agent for products which 
other firms had developed and patented and, also, Clarke Chapman 
manufactured patented products under license from firms such as the 
Peterson Water Tube Boiler Company and Westinghouse Electric 
(DS/CC1/1/1). Although the management accounting system was not 
employed to present explicit analyses for any of these strategic decisions, it 
may be inferred that it underlay them all. In face-to-face discussions (Boyce, 
2003) regarding these decisions, it is apparent that the Directors of Clarke 
Chapman acknowledged and acted upon the general experience of the 
shipbuilding and marine engineering industry that it was necessary to limit 
fixed costs and build flexibility into organisational and business structures 
(McLean, 1996, 2006).   
The above analyses indicate that, over an extended period of time, Clarke 
Chapman made a series of very complex and highly important strategic 
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decisions that were integral to the firm’s management of growth. Historic 
information derived from the management accounting system provided a 
backcloth to these decisions and was used explicitly in continue/dis-continue 
decisions. There is a long history of the use of management accounting 
information in strategic decision making in British industry, for example, 
from firms of the first Industrial Revolution (Fleischman and Parker, 1991), 
through to the Dowlais Iron Company (Boyns and Edwards, 1997a) and the 
Consett Iron Company (Boyns and Edwards, 1995) in the mid-nineteenth 
century. However, management accounting information was not always a 
significant factor in strategic decision making (McKinstry, 1999, p. 209). In 
his analysis of strategic decision making in a Tyneside shipbuilding and 
engineering firm between 1886 – 1914, McLean (2006, pp. 116 - 118) states 
that ‘although financial information was introduced into strategic decision 
making processes, it could be outweighed by non-financial considerations’ 
such as ‘personality and influence, together with the weight of history, 
tradition and loyalty, underlain by the hope that “something would turn up 
sooner or later”’. Furthermore, in his consideration of Albion Motors, 1900 – 
c. 1970, McKinstry (1999, p. 209) notes: 
It is clear that the founder-directors saw the business as primarily an 
engineering undertaking where engineering knowledge and a ‘scientific’ 
approach to problem solving represented the path to prosperity . . 
Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that the board minutes 
are devoid of any thoroughgoing or abstract review of strategy, which 
simply evolved as a result of decisions concerning the introduction or 
withdrawal of models (of truck) for particular markets in the face of 
generally buoyant demand. 
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Although Clarke Chapman possessed management accounting and business 
expertise as well as technical engineering capabilities, and employed this 
expertise in specific continuation/discontinuation decisions, its archive is 
also entirely devoid of ‘abstract’ strategic analysis, accounting or otherwise. 
The only available evidence containing a note of general strategic intent is a 
statement made by Henry Chapman in 1902: he indicated the element of 
caution that underlay the firm’s strategic decisions by noting that efforts to 
’increase our connection more particularly in Land Work (rather than Marine 
Work) . . . will save us putting our eggs all in one basket’ (DS/CC1/2/1). The 
current research argues that in Clarke Chapman, as in Albion Motors 
(Mckinstry, 1999), the fundamental organisational culture was derived from 
the firm’s founder (Brown, 1995, p.19) and, essentially, the firm’s strategic 
decisions to move into new technologies were expressions of its 
engineering-based organisational culture as informed by market awareness 
and networks rather than formal management accounting analyses.  
In examining the relationship between the engineering-based organisational 
culture and strategic decision-making in Clarke Chapman, it is useful to note 
the view of Penrose (2009, pp. 37-38) who differentiates between the 
‘objective’ productive opportunities that a firm is able to pursue with the 
resources at its disposal and the ‘subjective’ productive opportunities that it 
thinks it can pursue based on the entrepreneur’s knowledge and perception 
of the world. In essence, this view maintains that the firm’s strategic 
decisions are grounded in its ‘capability to build up images, not on its ability 
to process information’ (Ravix, 2002, p.170). The current research argues 
that these insights of Penrose and Ravix enable further understanding of 
Clarke Chapman’s strategic philosophy as reflected in Harry Chapman’s 
statement in 1907 that ‘(we) are looking forward for the future, not only 
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keeping up to date but even going beyond present knowledge’ 
(DS/CC1/2/1). Buoyed by generally increasing demand from the shipbuilding 
industry and the growth generated by the developments of the Second 
Industrial Revolution, Clarke Chapman was able to proceed with a broad but 
implicit growth strategy and a strategic decision making process based on an 
‘image’ or vision of technological development grounded in its engineering 
culture. In this sense, management accounting information played no 
explicit, formal part in the analysis or development of Clarke Chapman’s 
strategy and strategic decision making with regard to new technologies and 
organisational structures. Thus, the current research finds that Clarke 
Chapman’s management accounting system did not change abruptly 
because of, or in response to, these technological and organisational 
changes but evolved gradually over time. Moreover, the current research 
indicates that there was no conflict between engineers and accountants in 
respect of this. It is probable that the financial expertise available in the firm, 
backed by routine management accounting information, was significant in 
the face-to-face discussions (Boyce, 2003) between engineers and 
accountants where these strategic decisions were made and in forming the 
cautionary element that underlay them. Furthermore, management 
accounting information was used explicitly in strategic continue/discontinue 
decisions.   
5.   Management accounting, engineering and managerial control  
This section examines how management accounting and engineering were 
employed in the managerial control of Clarke Chapman. This examination is 
undertaken in the context of a statement made in early 1896 by J.B. 
Furneaux, the Managing Director: 
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 The year before us is full of promise & in order to (obtain the) best 
results both those inside the Works and our representatives outside 
must unitedly combine to make the most of the present. The time has 
come when every effort must be made to book orders at improved 
prices, and whilst cultivating our connections the aim of all in the Works 
should be to (1) adhere to promised dates for deliveries (2) reduce 
costs (3) prevent waste (4) improve and advance the soundness of our 
works and maintain the good reputation of the products of the 
company (DS/CC1/2/1).   
The current authors consider the above statement to be a good 
representation of Clarke Chapman’s approach to management throughout 
the research period, dealing with the implications of both the market and 
the engineering-based manufacturing function. The following sections 
examine Clarke Chapman’s annual management accounts and the roles of 
routine and ad hoc management accounting in the firm’s managerial control 
of its market and manufacturing operations.    
5.1  Annual management accounts 
The earliest partnership profit and loss accounts and balance sheets 
available in the archive are those covering the period 1883 – 1888 
(DS/CC1/74/1). A six month accounting period was employed in 1883 and 
1884 before settling down to an annual basis, this particular archive series 
coming to an end in 1888. These are significant dates, representing Charles 
Parsons’ entry into the partnership and exit from it. The accounts appear 
fully formed in 1883 and are probably based on the system of the pre-
Parsons partnership, simply amended to include Parsons. The balance sheets 
indicate that Captain Chapman and William Clarke were the senior figures in 
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the new partnership. In 1884, for example, respective capital balances were: 
Captain Chapman, £52,000; William Clarke, £46,000; and Charles Parsons, 
£14,000 (DS/CC1/74/1).  
There is no extant subsidiary accounting document or statement of 
accounting policy on which to base a technical consideration of the 
partnership accounting system (DS/CC1/74/1). Thus, for example, policies 
and practices relating to the calculation of cost of goods sold, research and 
development costs, depreciation and profit on work in progress cannot be 
ascertained. The profit and loss account measured the overall profit 
performance of the firm and the profit measurement system was formed 
around the firm’s organisation structure: within the company profit and loss 
account, elements of profit were attributed to manufacturing departments, 
such as the metal foundry, brass foundry, copper shop and forge, before 
company sales and general costs were considered. This indicates that Clarke 
Chapman used a transfer pricing system, as did firms in the contemporary 
coal, iron and steel (Boyns and Edwards, 1997b), and engineering and 
shipbuilding industries (McLean, 2006; Transactions, 1899).  
Annual financial reports (DS/CC1/26) were published after the formation of 
the limited company in 1893. These published reports were limited to a 
short summary of the application and appropriation of company profit and 
were extracted from the internal annual accounts (DS/CC1/74/2). Profit and 
other data reported externally and internally were consistent in agreement 
in each year of the research period. The current researchers consider that 
the internal annual accounts were more than simply the basis for external 
financial reporting but were, in effect, constructed as management 
accounts. These management accounts were the development and 
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extension of the partnership accounts produced previously and portrayed a 
significant amount of information on the functioning of the firm. 
The construction and format of the management profit and loss account was 
developed in response to the change in organisational structure on the re-
opening of the Electric Department in 1902. The company profit and loss 
account (DS/CC1/74/2) indicates that separate profit and loss accounts were 
prepared for the Electric Works and the General Works although, 
unfortunately, these do not survive in the archive. Profits from these two 
Works were transferred to the company profit and loss account where 
company expenses and dividends were deducted. Between 1893 and 1901, 
product development expenses and Electric Works development expenses 
were capitalised and subsequently written off, although the archives do not 
contain any explanation of this policy. In the period up to 1914, depreciation 
was not provided routinely each year and the Directors did not feel the need 
to apply consistent depreciation rates or to take heed of adverse comments 
from the auditors. For example, in 1910, Mr H. Walker, then Managing 
Director, noted (DS/CC1/2/1) that 
 . . the Auditors Report . . points out that we did not provide 
depreciation in 1908 and for this year only 3% off Plant and 2.5% off 
Buildings (but) in our opinion the amount already depreciated in 
previous years amply justifies us in the amount we have depreciated 
this year. 
Furthermore, Robert Scope, the Company Secretary, emphasised 
(DS/CC1/2/1) that the company’s depreciation policy was based on its desire 
to build a ‘solid’ balance sheet, 
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(regarding) depreciation . . Since the year 1900 we have written 
£61,360 off Plant and £16,990 off Buildings making a total of £78,350, 
the average percentage off old plant since 1900 being 5.53. I have not 
worked out the average on old buildings but the total since 1900 is 
22.5%. The old plant stood in 1900 at £88,000 (and) we have added 
since the £109,000 making £197,000 but only stands in the Books at 
£136,000 and . . . (the) Directors have been endeavouring to make the 
assets as solid as possible. 
In 1912, fixed assets were re-valued and Clarke Chapman decided not to 
provide depreciation, being supported by the auditors in that decision 
(DS/CC1/2/1). 
Although both the partnership and limited company annual accounts 
provided much potentially relevant management information, there is no 
archival evidence of their direct use in the management of Clarke Chapman. 
However, these accounts did serve as a database for the production of other 
routine and ad hoc management accounting reports. 
5.2  Management accounting and the market 
The current research argues that Clarke Chapman sought to deal with its 
market environments in three ways. First, in reacting to downturns in sales 
by undertaking fundamental re-organisations of the sales function. Second, 
by exercising direct, personal control where appropriate.  Third, by 
developing and employing market-related information. 
In 1893, Clarke Chapman opened a London office in order to provide the 
company with a base close to the centres of national power, especially the 
Admiralty (DS/CC1/1/1). Subsequently, branch offices were established in 
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London, Glasgow, Manchester, Cardiff and Sheffield. Beginning in a sales 
downturn in 1894 (Table 1), a national network of sales agents was 
developed, agents being appointed in South Wales, Liverpool, Argyleshire 
and the Western Isles, Northumberland, Edinburgh, Lancashire, Cheshire, 
Portsmouth, Southampton, the Isle of Wight, Sunderland, Hartlepool, 
Barrow-in-Furness, Birmingham, Hull, Dublin and Belfast (DS.HL/5/2/13). An 
international network of sales agents was established in 1894. Ultimately, 
the firm had overseas sales agents in Antwerp, Bergen, Buenos Aires, 
Christiana, Constantinople, Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Helsinki, Heraklion, 
Johannesburg, Melbourne, Nantes, Odessa, St. Petersburg, Stockholm, 
Sydney, Trieste and in areas of Canada, Greece, Egypt and the Sudan, New 
Zealand, and, in the East, India, Burma, China, including Hong Kong and 
Manchuria, Korea and Japan (DS/CC1/1/1; DS.HL/5/2/13). Furthermore, in 
response to a depression in the shipbuilding industry and a drop in their own 
sales (Table 1), in November 1903 the Directors of Clarke Chapman held a 
meeting with their United Kingdom sales agents and it was agreed that these 
agents would focus on the marine market and the company would focus on 
the land-work market. Moreover, Clarke Chapman appointed a ‘thoroughly 
practical engineer’ (DS/CC1/1/1) as a national land-sales representative. 
Thus, it may be seen that Clarke Chapman instigated significant 
organisational change in order to deal with adverse market conditions.  
Some new routine management accounting reports were produced in 
response to these changes. For example, reports were produced to monitor 
sales and orders by product group (DS/CC1/7/1/2/3). Alongside these new 
reports, the product costing system and the annual management accounts 
(DS/CC1/74/2; DS/CC1/77/1/2/3) were employed to scrutinise selling prices 
and sales values, costs and profit margins. Furthermore, ad hoc 
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management accounting reports were produced to examine particular 
issues. For example, a report covering the period 1901 – 1910 analysed the 
performance of a particular agent, detailing the sales that he generated and 
the salary, commission and general expenses that he incurred 
(DS/CC1/199(4)). However, all in all, there is an apparent paucity of 
management accounting information given the extent and complexity of 
Clarke Chapman’s sales organisation and product lines. It is apparent that 
once the company had set in place what it felt was the appropriate 
organisational structure, then it exercised direct and personal control where 
appropriate and carried out only a limited amount of routine and ad hoc 
management accounting to supplement these structural and direct control 
mechanisms. There is no evidence at all of any of Clarke Chapman’s 
managers, engineers or accountants expressing any dissatisfaction with 
these managerial control arrangements or of them developing their own 
personal, informal systems as their contemporaries did in other Tyneside 
firms (McLean, 2013). 
As noted above, the Clarke Chapman collection (DS/CC1/2/1) does indicate 
that a product costing system under-pinned the annual management 
accounts and provided information for managers. Unfortunately, this system 
has not survived in the archive and, therefore, it is not possible to trace its 
technical development. Nevertheless, in all of the surviving, voluminous 
managerial archive covering the period up to 1914, there is no evidence of 
any dis-satisfaction with the product costing system, no calls for change or 
development in it and no evidence of ‘fighting for turf’ (Boyns and  Edwards, 
2007, p. 980) over it between accountants and engineers. Although Clarke 
Chapman’s product costing system is not available for examination,  a 
contemporary writer, himself an accountant and Company Secretary and 
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General Manager of a shipbuilding and engineering company, has provided 
some useful insights into the design and use of such systems, noting (Burton, 
1900, pp. 1 - 2) that 
Well-organised engineering firms in the present day keep elaborate 
accounts of the cost of all work they perform, and these, when framed 
on  a correct basis and carefully worked out, form the most reliable 
data for future tenders; indeed, one of the principal services to which 
they can be applied is this of future estimating . . . Of course, our 
readers will understand that we do not refer to (the pricing of) standard 
types of machines, such as are described and priced in the catalogues of 
firms. The convenience of fixed prices for such articles as can be 
manufactured and delivered from stock, or can be proceeded with in 
anticipation of orders, is so great commercially as to outweigh any 
advantages to be obtained by individual estimating and tendering. 
These prices must indeed be from time to time revised, but the revision 
should be based on an average of actually obtained costs of 
manufacture, combined with considerations on the course of the 
market and competition.  
The research literature indicates that the need to set selling prices in 
competitive markets drove firms to make improvements in cost information 
(e.g. McKendrick, 1970; McLean, 1995; 2013), but there is no documentary 
evidence of any such impact on costing systems in Clarke Chapman. This firm 
undertook one-off contract work and also manufactured a huge variety and 
volume of standard catalogue products for stock. Thus, as Burton (1900) 
indicates, Clarke Chapman had to undertake both tendering for contracts 
and the setting and review of catalogue prices in competitive markets.  
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Although no direct calculations of tenders or catalogue prices survive in the 
firm’s archive, it is apparent that Clarke Chapman’s managers were alert to 
changing market conditions and that their product prices and profit margins 
were very sensitive to such changes. The Directors’ commentaries on market 
conditions, prices, costs and profit margins were presented in all of the 
surviving company annual reports, for example: 
· (in 1903) a heavy fall in prices took place owing to keen competition 
to secure the orders which were felt to be decreasing. Orders have 
to be booked in many cases at and below cost . . . . New shipbuilding 
orders are now very scarce, when in the market a great effort is 
made by all to secure the work at such prices as can be obtained 
(DS/CC1/26/3). 
 
· (in 1905) the Directors have to report that the Works are well 
supplied with orders, the prospects for the year seem encouraging, 
and although the costs for labour and material are considerably 
increased this year, efforts are being made to cover these as fully as 
possible (DS/CC1/26/1). 
 
· (in 1906) The very sharp rise in prices of material has largely 
increased the cost of production, but care is being taken, as far as 
possible, to obtain corresponding increases in prices for orders 
booked during the year (DS/CC1/26/2). 
 
· (in 1911) the present year has opened much more hopefully, the 
orders in hand are greater than a year ago, the enquiries are more 
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numerous, and it will be the aim of your Directors to take the fullest 
advantage of the improved conditions (DS/CC1/26/4). 
 
· (in 1911) the output for 1911 was the largest on record, but the 
prices obtained were exceedingly bare . . . Prices are improving and 
(we have) a large volume of orders on hand (DS/CC1/26/5). 
 
· (in 1912) the volume of work done . . exceeded that of any previous 
year, the prices also improved, and in consequence the results are 
more satisfactory (DS/CC1/26/6). 
 
Thus, the surviving annual reports, spanning 1903 – 1912, indicate that 
Clarke Chapman operated in a highly competitive environment in which 
prices were sensitive to changing market conditions. Whilst the firm 
monitored costs, the tasks of tendering and pricing in competitive markets 
did not lead to any pressure for the change and development of the firm’s 
product costing system.  
5.3  Management accounting and manufacturing  
In this section of the article, the current authors examine the implication of 
management accounting and engineering in Clarke Chapman’s development 
of managerial control in its manufacturing function. The firm’s management 
control was based on three linked elements. First, the analysis and re-
organisation of the manufacturing function and manufacturing methods. 
Second, the use of direct personal controls. Third, the employment of 
management accounting information.  
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Although the archive (DS/CC) does not contain a detailed description of the 
organisation of Clarke Chapman’s manufacturing function, Shaw (1911, p. 
104) presents a contemporary insight into it, 
Messrs Clarke, Chapman & Co., Ltd., are a firm who have attained a 
world-wide celebrity, their productions being met with wherever 
examples of British engineering are found. This eminent firm originated 
in 1864, and has prospered in an almost unparalleled degree, being 
now one of the greatest establishments of its kind in the kingdom. 
The works cover 14 acres of land, and employ 2,500 to 3,000 men. They 
represent a striking example of elaborate and systematic organization 
and have been planned in a manner best conducive to convenience and 
expedition of manufacture. The works adjoin the South Shields branch 
of the North Eastern Railway, and are amply fed by sidings. . . All 
buildings are spacious and well lighted, and the large offices are an 
eloquent illustration of the firm’s extensive commercial routine. 
Each department is replete with machinery exemplifying the latest 
developments of mechanical engineering science as applied to their 
specialities. The motive power throughout is electricity, and the 
buildings are illuminated by the same power. It is no exaggeration to 
say that a more complete and modern plant for the various processes 
of manufacture is not to be met within the kingdom.  
Thus, it is apparent that Clarke Chapman grew to become a large, complex 
engineering firm at the forefront of technological and organisational 
development. Clarke Chapman undertook its most significant reorganisation 
of manufacturing during the downturn of 1904 when sales were 86% of 1903 
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levels and 81% of 1902 levels (Table 1). A General Works Manager was 
appointed at the head of a team of five managers in the General 
Department, four in the Electrical Department and one in the Metal Foundry 
(DS/CC1/145/1). Henry Chapman noted (DS/CC1/2/1) that 
in the earlier months (of 1904) work was very scarce, and throughout 
the prices ruling were very low. One advantage resulting from this 
depression is that we took the opportunity of looking carefully into the 
cost of production and we have been able to reduce this materially by 
the introduction of new machine tools, high speed steel and cheaper 
methods . . and (the linking of) one department more effectively to 
another particularly in the utilization of machinery. 
Thus Clarke Chapman’s use of cost information lay at the heart of the 
fundamental re-organisation of its manufacturing system. It is apparent that 
the product costing system was judged to be fit for purpose and that there 
was no need to change or develop it to provide useful information for 
managers. However, the centrality of direct, personal management was also 
evidenced in this re-organisation. Henry Chapman commented (DS/CC1/2/1) 
that with one General Works Manager, there was ‘one Manager to whom 
the Directors can go for all information about any part of the Works.’ 
A further aspect of the 1904 re-organisation was the introduction of an 
incentive scheme for foremen. Henry Chapman observed (DS/CC1/1/1) that  
The question of paying a bonus to the various foremen having engaged 
our attention for some time with a view to reducing the percentage of 
labour (cost) to output, and stimulating them to use their best 
endeavours to this end  . . It is hereby decided to introduce the system 
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– subject to discontinuance at any time at our discretion if found not to 
produce the desired results – by a bonus of 20% of the savings in the 
reduction on the percentage of labour (cost) to total (sales value of) 
output, taking the labour cost generally over the first six months of this 
year and the (total output) . . as may be found most convenient to 
establish a basis. Such percentage established being subject to 
fluctuations in the selling price of goods and general advances and 
reductions in wages – the bonus to be paid in February of each year and 
after results are ascertained.  
Thus management accounting information was at the core of this incentive 
scheme. As this information was already produced for other purposes the 
incentive scheme could be introduced and operated at the minimal extra 
clerical cost of  a ‘weekly return of wages to output’ (DS/CC1/201) instituted 
in 1904. There is no evidence that the foremen themselves used a 
management accounting system in the control and reduction of labour costs 
and it is probable that, in common with other British firms (Boyns and 
Edwards, 1997a, p. 43) they relied on direct, personal supervision. However, 
from 1884, Clarke Chapman’s managers also had access to the ‘weekly 
numbers of workmen analysed by department and trade’ (DS/CC1/129/1 - 
12), a simple but potentially useful control mechanism. 
Similarly, Clarke Chapman’s product costing information relating to materials 
and labour was employed in the context of careful scrutiny and direct 
controls. For example, the firm placed forward contracts ‘at most favourable 
prices’ for the purchase of materials and negotiated reductions in freight 
costs with the North Eastern Railway Company and reductions in business 
rates with Gateshead Council (DS/CC1/2/1). From 1884, Clarke Chapman 
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developed its routine management accounting reporting for manufacturing 
by preparing comparative tables of output ((DS/CC1/199). Furthermore, 
from 1901, this routine system was extended to include the preparation of 
‘weekly salaries analyses’ (DS/CC1/140/1-2) and ‘monthly salaries analyses’ 
(DS/CC1/145/1), offering the potential to scrutinise and control this 
particular overhead cost. Ad hoc management accounting reports were 
prepared to examine the financial implications of particular issues such as 
strikes (DS/CC1/59). In a further extension to the management accounting 
system, from 1912 the firm prepared ‘forecast statements of sales, output, 
costs and profit’ (DS/CC1/204).  
Thus, in developing managerial control of its manufacturing function, Clarke 
Chapman responded to economic downturn by undertaking significant 
reorganisations of its management structure, production system, and 
information management process. The current research finds that routine 
and ad hoc management accounting information for planning and control 
was developed in an evolutionary manner whilst the firm continued to 
exercise direct and personal business controls. Furthermore, the current 
research finds that there is no evidence that engineers or managers ever 
expressed any dissatisfaction with the management accounting system or 
fought for the control of it.  
6.   Conclusions 
Clarke Chapman benefited  from being enmeshed in various networks: links 
with the Quaker financial and banking community helped to provide 
financial stability for the firm; Robert Spence Watson, the firm’s solicitor, 
enabled diversification into electricity; and networks built upon personal 
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relationships and trust were fundamental to success in the shipbuilding and 
marine engineering industry.  
The narrative and analysis of the current research indicates that Clarke 
Chapman operated on an engineering ethos and that engineers were at the 
heart of the business. However, it is clear that Joseph Gurney, Captain Abel 
Henry Chapman, Robert Scope and William Taylor provided continuity of 
accounting leadership and acted as a counter-balance to engineering. Clarke 
Chapman’s strategic decision making was framed by its engineering values 
and the long-term view taken by its owners and managers. Diversification 
into new technologies was based on the firm’s engineering ethos, market 
awareness and network inputs. In this context, management accounting 
information was not developed for explicit strategic decision making but 
information from the routine management accounting system was available 
for use in face-to-face strategic discussions which were tempered by 
financial caution. However, management accounting information was used 
explicitly in strategic continue/dis-continue decisions. Furthermore, although 
Clarke Chapman employed a direct, personal approach to management 
control, including the control of labour, it did so in conjunction with routine 
and ad hoc management accounting reports developed to aid this process.  
In examining the impact of the fluctuations in demand from Clarke 
Chapman’s markets on the development of the firm’s management 
accounting system, the current research found that severe downturns in 
demand led the firm to undertake significant re-organisations of its sales and 
manufacturing functions, with the management and scrutiny of costs being 
important elements underlying these re-organisations. However, rapid 
upturns in the market did not lead to any discernible impact on any of the 
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firm’s management systems. Neither periods of rapidly rising or rapidly 
falling demand caused engineers or accountants to question and change 
Clarke Chapman’s management accounting system to any significant extent. 
Based on the available archive evidence, the current research concludes that 
Clarke Chapman’s management accounting system developed in a gradual, 
evolutionary manner in line with the overall growth trend of the firm rather 
than as a response to fluctuations in demand and organisational shock.   
The Clarke Chapman archive contains no evidence of its engineers’ use of 
engineering alternatives to accounting as noted in other firms of the period 
(McKinstry, 1999; McLean, 2013; McLean and Tyson, 2006). Furthermore, 
there is no evidence to support the finding of Hopper, Cooper, Lowe and 
Capps (1986) that engineers and engineering culture undermined the 
operation and use of management accounting systems. The current research 
finds that the firm’s management accounting system was designed and 
operated by accountants and provides support for the view (McLean, 2013) 
that, in some companies at least, there was no ’fighting for turf’ (Boyns and 
Edwards, 2007, p.994) between engineers and accountants over the 
development and ownership of management accounting systems. In Clarke 
Chapman, each of these professional groupings was content with the 
company’s management accounting system and with their separate, distinct 
but complementary roles in the management of the firm’s growth. It is 
apparent, then, that engineering and accounting are not necessarily 
uncongenial partners when each has strong leadership at a senior 
management level and the disciplines have clearly defined spheres of 
influence. Given that this finding contradicts much of the recent research 
literature, it is recommended that future research should investigate the 
roles of the engineering and accounting professions in the development of 
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management accounting in particular organisational contexts. It is suggested 
that a key observation of the current research is that accounting was 
represented at the most senior levels of Clarke Chapman management. 
Although the firm had an engineering ethos and culture this did not exclude 
or dominate accounting and, thus, engineering and accounting were 
relatively equal partners in the management and growth of the firm. Future 
research should pay particular attention to this balance of organisational 
power and authority between engineering and accounting. Such research 
has the potential to contribute not only to our knowledge of the 
development of management accounting but also to contribute to the 
literature on the roles of management accounting in British economic 
growth and decline (McKinstry, 1999).  
The current researchers also suggest that valuable contributions to our 
understanding of management accounting may be made by further studies 
which examine the impact of company growth and fluctuations in demand 
on management accounting systems. Furthermore, the impact of business 
networks on the development of management accounting offers much 
scope for further research 
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